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A First Amendment Deference Approach to 
Reforming Anti-Bullying Laws 
Emily Suski* 
INTRODUCTION 
At the risk of making a large understatement, bullying among students is 
a complicated problem. It can take multiple forms: physical, verbal, relational, 
which includes imposing social isolation on another, and cyberbullying.1 
Bullying also occurs on a large scale. According to at least one study, 
approximately one-third of students in middle school grades have reported 
experiencing bullying.2 In addition, the effects of bullying are varied and 
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 1. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) has developed 
a uniform definition of bullying. That definition is as follows:  
[A]ny unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another youth or group of 
youths who are not siblings or current dating partners that involves an 
observed or perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times 
or is highly likely to be repeated. Bullying may inflict harm or distress 
on the targeted youth including physical, psychological, social, or 
educational harm. 
R.M. GLADDEN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CTRL. & PREVENTION, BULLYING 
SURVEILLANCE AMONG YOUTHS 7 (2014). The CDC also notes the multiple forms 
of bullying, including physical, verbal, and relational, as well as damage to 
property. Id. at 7–8. 
 2. Simone Robers et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2012, 2012 
DOJ BUREAU JUST. STAT. ANN. REP. 46 (2013), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2013/201 
3036.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8QH-L54V]. In some studies these numbers are even 
higher. One study found that 39% of sixth grade students reported bullying. VICTORIA 
STUART-CASSEL ET AL., SOCIAL BULLYING: CORRELATES, CONSEQUENCES, AND 
PREVENTION 3 (2013), http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/sites/default/files/1315%2 
0NCSSLE%20Social%20Bullying%20d7_lvr_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYC6-GW85].  




significant, ranging from negative academic outcomes to suicide.3 Despite the 
complicated and widespread nature of the problem, most states’ anti-bullying 
laws call for a school-level response to bullying that lacks a level of nuance to 
match the problem.4 Most laws call for, and sometimes require, schools to 
respond to bullying no differently than any other serious student disciplinary 
problem, which usually means suspending, expelling, or otherwise excluding 
students who bully from school.5 This is so despite the fact that social science 
research indicates that school exclusion rarely works in response to bullying 
and can actually exacerbate it. 6 
In addition, when bullying takes the form of speech—as much of it 
does—school interventions also implicate the First Amendment. Public 
schools are arms of the state.7 Thus, any intervention in response to 
                                                                                                         
 3. Infra Part I.A. 
 4. All of the states now have anti-bullying laws, and almost without 
exception, these laws place the responsibility on the schools for addressing the 
problem. The vast majority focus schools’ responses implicitly or explicitly on 
school exclusion. See infra note 50 and accompanying text. Kentucky, Idaho, and 
arguably Montana are the three states that do not call for schools to intervene 
when bullying happens. Kentucky and Idaho’s laws are in the states’ criminal 
codes, so the criminal justice system, not the public schools, has responsibility for 
combatting bullying in those states. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150 (West 2016). In Montana, which had no anti-
bullying law until 2015, the law prohibits bullying in schools, but does not 
specifically require schools to take actions to address it. Bully-Free Montana Act, 
2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through § 20-5-
210 (West 2016)). Instead, it states that victims can take any recourse available to 
them under state or federal law. Id. That said, the law also does not preclude 
schools from punishing bullies–it just does not require it.  
 5. Infra note 57; see also Brea L. Perry & Edward W. Morris, Suspending 
Progress: Collateral Consequences of Exclusionary Punishment in Public 
Schools, 79 AM. SOC. REV. 1067, 1069–70 (2014) (defining and discussing school 
exclusion).  
 6. Infra notes 196–202 and accompanying text. That is not to say that the 
bullying laws even with their focus on school exclusion have had no effect. New 
research does suggest that the laws have done something to stem the tide of 
bullying. Mark L. Hatzenbuehler et al., Associations Between Antibullying 
Policies and Bullying in 25 States, 169 JAMA PEDIATRICS ONLINE 10 (2015). The 
study did not identify the reason bullying laws have had some effect—whether 
from raising awareness and therefore increased reporting of bullying or for some 
other reason.  
 7. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
(noting “the State in the person of school officials” can impinge on students’ First 
Amendment rights in school under some circumstances). 




bullying that also constitutes speech raises First Amendment questions.8 
This Article explores the problems associated with school exclusion as a 
response to bullying in light of the complicated nature of the problem and 
the attendant First Amendment concerns. It argues in favor of drawing on 
First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly by deconstructing rationales 
for the deference afforded schools to suppress student speech, to develop 
better, more comprehensive legal approaches to combatting bullying that 
also address those First Amendment concerns. In doing so, it also seeks to 
fill a gap in the literature on bullying. Although scholars have explored the 
limits that the Constitution, including the First Amendment, places on anti-
bullying laws, they have not done so in light of the complicated nature of 
the problem, the interventions called for in response, or by examining the 
rationales for public school deference to suppress student speech.9  
First, to illustrate the difficulties with crafting responses to bullying, 
take the example of Hailee Lamberth. Hailee was a 13-year-old Nevada 
public school student who tragically committed suicide on December 12, 
2013.10 In her suicide note, Hailee said that she committed suicide because 
other students at school had been bullying her.11 According to Hailee’s 
father, the students had been calling Hailee names like “fat” and “ugly” 
repeatedly over a period of time.12 Hailee’s suicide note asked that her 
school be informed of the reasons she committed suicide so that “next 
                                                                                                         
 8. Infra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.  
 9. These scholars have assessed how the anti-bullying laws can comply with 
First Amendment and Fourth Amendment limits. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, 
Hostile Educational Environments, 71 MD. L. REV. 705 (2012) (arguing that a 
particular type of bullying laws, cyberbullying laws, can survive First 
Amendment challenges); Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can 
Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That 
Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment Challenges, 
46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641 (2011) (focusing on cyberbullying and proposing 
that cyberbullying laws comply with the standards set forth in relevant Supreme 
Court cases, including Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District); Douglas E. Abrams, Recognizing the Public Schools’ Authority to 
Discipline Students’ Off-Campus Cyberbullying of Classmates, 37 NEW 
ENGLAND J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181 (2011) (arguing that public schools 
should be responsible for addressing students’ off-campus cyberbullying and can 
under the First and Fourth Amendments). 
 10. Trevon Milliard, Father: White Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to 
Bullying, L.V. REV. J. (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:26 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/news 
/father-white-middle-school-student-s-suicide-related-bullying [https://perma.cc/5W 
AT-F8K4].  
 11. Id.  
 12. Id.  




time” the school would prevent what happened to her from happening to 
another student.13 Notably, at the time Hailee committed suicide, Nevada 
had an anti-bullying law in place, one that called for discipline, which 
could include school exclusion as a means to address the problem.14 
Whether implemented or not, the law did not help Hailee. Indeed, even if 
school exclusion could have helped Hailee, though social science literature 
suggests it could not, such an intervention may not have been available to 
the school because any one-time instance of bullying that Hailee 
experienced may have been protected by the First Amendment.15  
Although schools do have more latitude to suppress student speech, 
including student-bullying speech, than other state actors, that deference is 
limited. First, any anti-bullying law has to comply with First Amendment 
overbreadth constraints.16 In addition, and as a general matter, schools can 
only suppress student speech that would otherwise be protected by the First 
Amendment if the schools can reasonably anticipate the speech will cause a 
substantial disruption to the work of the schools or infringe on the rights of 
others.17 Although this standard effectively gives schools increased 
authority to suppress student speech, it still protects some speech. Thus, the 
kind of speech that harmed Hailee Lamberth must either be disruptive to the 
school or injure another’s rights. An individual instance of name-calling, 
like that to which Hailee was subjected, arguably does not rise to this level. 
The first time Hailee was called “fat” or “ugly” may not have met this 
standard. Depending on the circumstances, the third or fifth time a student 
is called such a name may not have either. A one-time instance of name-
calling may be part of a pattern of behavior that constitutes bullying, but 
it may not on its own disrupt the school or injure another person’s rights. 
Thus, a one-time instance is arguably protected by the First Amendment, 
meaning it cannot be suppressed by the public schools, whether through 
school exclusion or any other means of intervention. 
Anti-bullying laws therefore raise questions both about the way the 
laws call for schools to respond to the problem of bullying and whether, 
given First Amendment constraints, the schools can even respond at all. 
Drawing both concerns together, this Article makes a twofold argument. 
First, it argues that the anti-bullying laws represent a limited response to 
the complicated problem of bullying that raise First Amendment concerns 
despite the deference afforded schools to suppress student speech. Second, 
it contends that First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly the rationales 
                                                                                                         
 13. Id.  
 14. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1351(2) (Supp. 2013). 
 15. Infra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 16. Infra Part II.A.  
 17. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 




for giving schools this deference, offers ways both to reform the laws and 
satisfy those First Amendment concerns.  
This Article begins by providing an overview of the anti-bullying 
laws. To explain how these laws constitute a narrow approach to the 
problem, it summarizes the scope and effects of bullying. It then describes 
how the majority of states take a punitive approach to bullying that is 
focused on school exclusion.18 Part II explores the First Amendment 
implications, including the doctrine on overbreadth with respect to student 
speech and the deferential standards applied to schools when they act to 
suppress student speech. It also examines the rationale underlying that 
deference, one that is based on the Supreme Court’s particular 
understandings about the work of public schools. More specifically, it 
identifies the particular analytic framework for affording schools 
deference to suppress student speech as dependent on both the type of 
speech and its understanding of the school role in relation to that speech. 
Part III then analyzes the anti-bullying laws in light of the First 
Amendment doctrine on overbreadth, the deferential standards applied to 
the suppression of student speech, and the rationales for that deference. It 
explains how the anti-bullying laws can at times run afoul of the First 
Amendment both facially on overbreadth grounds and as applied despite 
the deferential standard for when schools can constitutionally suppress 
student speech. In addition, it explains how the means for suppressing that 
speech—often school exclusion—stand in tension with the rationale 
underlying the deference given schools for suppressing it. Part IV then 
explores how resolving this tension offers a way forward. It contends that 
if the anti-bullying laws were better aligned with the Court’s 
understanding of schools’ work, then an argument exists that schools 
should receive more deference in suppressing student-bullying speech. In 
doing so, it calls for adding a layer to the framework that depends on the 
type of speech and schools’ role in relation to it so that the analysis 
includes consideration of the means schools use for fulfilling their roles in 
the bullying context. This framework, then, makes the deference given 
schools dependent on not just the type of speech and the schools’ role in 
relation to it, but also on the means the schools use to suppress the speech. 
Under this framework, if legislatures called for schools to use means of 
addressing bullying that better align with the Court’s understanding of 
schools’ work, or at least did not use means such as school exclusion that 
are known to be ineffective, then schools should get more deference to 
suppress bullying speech. Such a framework would make the anti-bullying 
laws more workable, avoiding the First Amendment problems the laws 
                                                                                                         
 18. Infra Part I.B. 




now face, and more effective for victims, students who bully, and schools. 
Perhaps most importantly, more workable bullying laws could better 
prevent tragedies like Hailee’s.  
I. ANTI-BULLYING LAWS: LIMITED SOLUTIONS 
FOR A COMPLEX PROBLEM 
Although the problem of bullying is widespread and its effects are 
complex, the anti-bullying laws require schools to respond to bullying in 
a fairly limited way—by imposing discipline or consequences on the 
students who bully.19 Not only do the anti-bullying laws all take a punitive 
approach to bullying, the overwhelming majority of anti-bullying laws 
further focus interventions on school exclusion by explicitly or implicitly 
identifying it as a means to accomplish that discipline.20 Understanding 
just how limited the laws’ responses to bullying are requires an 
understanding of the scope and nature of the bullying problem and its 
effects.  
A. The Scope and Effects of the Bullying Problem 
Bullying happens frequently and affects a large proportion of students 
in school. In 2009-2010, bullying occurred on a weekly or daily basis in 
23% of schools.21 That statistic, though, reflects the prevalence of bullying 
across all age groups and grade levels.22 Disaggregating the bullying rate 
by grade level indicates that the percentage of students who have been 
bullied is even higher in certain grades. Perhaps unsurprisingly those 
grades are middle school grades. In 2011, approximately 37% of sixth 
                                                                                                         
 19. In the spring of 2015, Montana became the last state to pass an anti-
bullying law. The law defines and prohibits bullying in school. However, the law 
only states that students can seek redress for bullying under any available civil or 
criminal law. Bully-Free Montana Act, 2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through § 20-5-210 (West 2016)). It does not specifically 
call on schools to impose consequences on the bully. Even so, as the law prohibits 
bullying in school, a good case can be made that it violates school rules. As a 
result, then, a school administrator could impose discipline for bullying.  
 20. Kentucky’s law and Idaho’s law do not call on schools to respond to 
bullying because their anti-bullying laws are in their criminal codes. Therefore, 
students who engage in bullying behavior can face criminal penalties. IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 525.070 (West 2016).  
 21. Robers et al., supra note 2, at 32. 
 22. Id.  




grade students reported being bullied.23 In the same year, 30% of seventh 
grade students and 31% of eighth grade students reported being bullied.24  
When these studies discuss bullying, they identify it as taking any one 
of four forms: physical, verbal, relational, and cyberbullying. Of these 
forms of bullying, perhaps the one most commonly thought of as 
traditional bullying is physical bullying. Physical bullying involves, as the 
name suggests, physical attacks such as kicking, hitting, and punching.25 
Verbal bullying consists of name-calling and harmful, hurtful teasing.26 
Social, or relational, bullying occurs by means such as social isolation, 
rumor spreading, and friendship manipulation.27 It has “the effect of 
undermining social status and threatening feelings of support, security, 
and closeness in youth relationships.”28 Cyberbullying, the newest form 
of bullying whose rise is associated with the increased use of technology 
as a form of communication, is similar to verbal and social bullying, but 
is distinctive in its means.29 Cyberbullying involves the use of electronic 
methods of communication to bully.30 No matter the form it takes, bullying 
is distinguished from playful or even hostile teasing by a power 
imbalance.31 The bully has more power than the victim and uses it against 
                                                                                                         
 23. Id. at 46. In some studies, these numbers are even higher. One study found 
that 39% of sixth grade students reported bullying. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra 
note 2, at 3. 
 24. Robers et al., supra note 2, at 46. Although the percentage of students 
who report being bullied goes down in high school, approximately one-quarter of 
students still report bullying in high school. The follow shows the percentage of 
high school students who reported bullying in 2011: 26% of ninth, 28% of tenth, 
24% of 11th, and 22% of 12th graders. Id.  
 25. Tracy E. Waasdorp & Catherine P. Bradshaw, The Overlap Between 
Cyberbullying and Traditional Bullying, 56 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 483, 483 
(2015); Jing Wang et al., School Bullying Among US Adolescents: Physical, 
Verbal, Relational, and Cyber, J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 368, 369 (2009).  
 26. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.  
 27. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369.  
 28. STUART-CASSEL ET AL., supra note 2, at 1. Relational bullying also tends 
to be more common among girls than boys. Id. at 3.  
 29. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369. 
 30. Waasdorp & Bradshaw, supra note 25; Wang et al., supra note 25, at 369. 
 31. Dewey Cornell et al., Perceived Prevalence of Teasing and Bullying 
Predicts High School Dropout Rates, 105 J. EDUC. PSCYHOL. 138, 138 (2012); 
Shane R. Jimerson et al., International Scholarship Advances Science and 
Practice Addressing Bullying in Schools, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN 
SCHOOLS 1 (Jimerson et al. eds., 2010); Dan Olweus, Understanding and 
Researching Bullying: Some Critical Issues, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN 
SCHOOLS 11 (Jimerson et al. eds., 2010). Scholars have worried about punishing 




the victim by way of one or more of the forms of bullying.32 In this sense, 
then, bullying is exploitive.  
Bullying also wreaks havoc on victims, and its effects range from the 
relatively minor to the tragic. The academic achievement of the victims of 
bullying tends to be lower than other students who have not experienced 
bullying.33 Victims are also more likely to avoid school and drop out of 
school entirely.34 Victims experience a number of negative psychological 
effects as well, with increased rates of depression and anxiety.35 
Alarmingly, victims also have an increased sense of hopelessness. That 
increased sense of hopelessness coupled with depression puts victims at 
increased risk for suicide.36  
                                                                                                         
students and youth for behavior that is typically adolescent. In particular, they 
have understandably raised concerns about how typical adolescent or youthful 
behavior has led to involvement in the juvenile or criminal justice system. Kristin 
Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color: 
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 
386–87 (2013) (arguing that the juvenile justice system treats youth of color more 
harshly because it fails to recognize their behavior as a product of their 
immaturity—that is, that the behavior is normal adolescent behavior). The 
bullying social science researchers have turned their attention to is distinguished 
from playful or even hurtful teasing by the power imbalance that is central to the 
concept of bullying behavior. See Dewey Cornell and Sharmila Bandyopadhyay, 
The Assessment of Bullying, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 265 
(Jimerson et al. eds., 2010); Jimerson et al., supra at 2; Olweus, supra at 11.  
 32. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31; 
Olweus, supra note 31. 
 33. Susan M. Swearer et al., What Can Be Done about School Bullying? Linking 
Research to Educational Practice, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 38 (2012) [hereinafter 
What Can Be Done About Bullying?]; Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 139. 
 34. What Can Be Done About Bullying?, supra note 33, at 38–39; Cornell et 
al., supra note 31, at 147. 
 35. Hannah L. Schacter et al., “Why Me?”: Characterological Self-Blame and 
Continued Victimization in the First Year of Middle School, 44 J. CLINICAL CHILD 
& ADOLESCENT PSYCHOL. 446 (2014); Susan M. Swearer et al., Assessment of 
Bullying/Victimization: The Problem of Comparability Across Studies and Across 
Methodolgies, in HANDBOOK OF BULLYING IN SCHOOLS 312, 323 (Jimerson et al. 
eds., 2010) [hereinafter Assessment of Bullying/Victimization].  
 36. Rina A. Bonano & Shelley Hymel, Beyond Hurt Feelings: Investigating Why 
Some Victims of Bullying Are at Greater Risk for Suicidal Ideation, 56 MERRILL-
PALMER Q. 420, 433 (2010). While some student suicides related to bullying make 
national news, other suicides only make local news. In 2013, Rebecca Ann Sedwick, 
a 12-year-old Florida girl, committed suicide by jumping off a silo at an abandoned 
cement plant, and it was reported in the New York Times. Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s 
Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), 




Furthermore, studies have shown that the effects of bullying on 
victims are equal to, or more severe than, child maltreatment and are 
longer lasting.37 A recently published study found that a child who is 
bullied continues to face negative consequences of bullying into young 
adulthood.38 Many of these long-term negative consequences are similar 
to those that victims of bullying experience at the time of the bullying.39 
They include depression, anxiety, self-harm, suicidal ideation, and suicide 
itself.40  
The negative consequences of bullying are not limited to the victims. 
Although perhaps less sympathetic than the victims, students who bully 
also experience negative consequences that relate to their bullying 
behavior.41 They are more likely to be angry, depressed, and more 
aggressive than other students.42 Students who bully are also more likely 
to have conduct problems43 and problems with delinquency.44 Moreover, 
like victims, the bullies too have an increased incidence of depression and 
suicidal ideation.45  
                                                                                                         
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-
on-web-sites.html [https://perma.cc/3G2S-WD7U]. When Hailee Lamberth 
committed suicide, it was reported in local news reports. Milliard, supra note 10. 
Although reporting these suicides helps spur action, the suicides are also personal 
tragedies for the families of the students. As such, it seems safe to assume that some 
suicides do not make the news at all.  
 37. E.g., Suzet T. Lereya et al., Adult Mental Health Consequences of Peer 
Bullying and Maltreatment in Childhood: Two Cohorts in Two Countries, 2 
LANCET PSYCHIATRY 524 (2015).  
 38. Id. at 529. 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Assessment of Bullying/Victimization, supra note 35, at 323.  
 42. Id.; Susan M. Swearer et al., Internalizing Problems in Students Involved 
in Bullying and Victimization: Implications for Intervention, in BULLYING IN 
AMERICAN SCHOOLS 63, 65–66 (Dorothy L. Espelage & Susan M. Swearer eds., 
2004) [hereinafter Internalizing Problems]. 
 43. Assessment of Bullying/Victimization, supra note 35, at 323.  
 44. What Can Be Done About Bullying?, supra note 33. 
 45. Id.; Internalizing Problems, supra note 42, at 65–66. In addition to 
students who bully and students who are victims, there are also students who fall 
into the category of bully-victims. Bully-victims are students who both bully and 
are victims of bullying. Clayton R. Cook et al., Predictors of Bullying and 
Victimization in Childhood and Adolescence: A Meta-Analytic Investigation, 25 
SCH. PSYCHOL. Q. 65, 76 (2010). The research on these students suggests they too 
feel the complicated effects of bullying and are in need of individualized 
interventions. Id. at 78–80.  




B. State Anti-Bullying Laws 
Recognizing these harmful effects of bullying, in December 2010, the 
Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, called the bullying problem an urgent 
one and took a series of steps in response.46 The Department of Education, 
in conjunction with the Departments of Health and Human Services, 
Agriculture, Interior, Defense, and Justice, held a summit to study the 
problem and launched a website with information about bullying.47 The 
Department of Education also published guidance for states and school 
districts in an effort to spur efforts addressing bullying.48 The federal 
government has not been alone in calling for action to address bullying. For 
years, parents, activists, and scholars, among others, have been calling on 
states and schools to stem the tide of this widespread problem.49  
                                                                                                         
 46. Letter from Arne Duncan, U.S. Sec’y of Educ., to Colleagues (Dec. 16, 
2010), http://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html [https://perma 
.cc/MBX9-5XHV].  
 47. Id. 
 48. The guidance provided by the United States serves as technical assistance 
and outlines what it terms “key strategies” of anti-bullying laws. The key 
strategies include developing a specific definition of bullying, consistent with 
federal and state law, and prohibiting such conduct. It calls on states to develop 
or require schools to develop procedures for reporting bullying and for 
investigating and responding to reports of bullying. In responding to bullying, the 
technical assistance document suggests that anti-bullying laws and policies should 
describe consequences, which need to be imposed, and they should be graduated. 
The document does not ignore the victim and suggests a process to refer the victim 
to counseling. Id. 
 49. See, e.g., Sandra Cherub, Nevada Gov. Brian Sandoval Signs Anti-Bullying 
Legislation, L.V. REV. J. (May 20, 2015, 2:53 PM), http://www.reviewjournal.com 
/news/nevada-legislature/nevada-gov-brian-sandoval-signs-anti-bullying-legislation 
[https://perma.cc/8PXR-2XAJ]; Milliard, supra note 10; Goodno, supra note 9; Kelly 
A. Albin, Bullies in a Wired World: The Impact of Cyberspace Victimization on 
Adolescent Mental Health and the Need for Cyberbullying Legislation in Ohio, 25 J.L. 
& HEALTH 155 (2012); Dan Savage, Anti-Gay Bullying Claims Another Victim, SLOG 
(July 17, 2013, 11:59 AM), http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2013 
/07/17/anti-gay-bullying-and-hate-claims-another-victim [https://perma.cc/V5KC-
ZGBH]; Our Mission, STOMP OUT BULLYING, http://www.stompoutbullying.org/in 
dex.php/about/mission/ [https://perma.cc/RC2N-VWEM] (last visited Sept. 27, 
2016); October is National Bullying Prevention Month, PACER’S NAT’L BULLYING 
PREVENTION CTR., http://www.pacer.org/bullying/nbpm/ [https://perma.cc/Y5BW-
MGTX] (last visited Sept. 27, 2016). 




Every state has heeded the call to respond to the problem of bullying 
by passing anti-bullying laws.50 Despite the pervasive nature of the 
bullying problem and the complexity of its effects, bullying laws often do 
not call for adequate intervention. Although they do reflect an effort to 
cover all forms of bullying, the laws typically fail to require schools to 
intervene in more than a relatively limited way.  
The definitions of bullying found in the anti-bullying laws acknowledge 
that bullying, as defined in social science research, takes multiple forms. 
Thus, the laws generally prohibit bullying regardless of form—physical, 
written, verbal, or cyber.51 In addition, the laws outline the degree of 
                                                                                                         
 50. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-1–16-28B-9 (2016); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
14.33.200 (West 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2016); ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 6-18-514 (West 2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (amended 
by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 
2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (West 2016); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
1535.01 (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 20-2-751.4 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-2 (LexisNexis 2016); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7 (West 
2016); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28 
(West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
158.150 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416.13 (2016); ME. STAT. 
tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2016); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West 
2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-
67 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 
20-5-209 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-2137 (West 2016); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 388.121–388.1327 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2016); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7 
(LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 115C-407.15 (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17 (West 
2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-
100.3 (2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.351 (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-33 
(West 2016); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120 (2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-
15 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4502 (West 2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. 
§ 37.0832 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201  (West 
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 11 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 
(West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.46 (West 2016); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West 2016). 
 51. E.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900  (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28; N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 193-F:3.  




severity that the acts must achieve to constitute bullying. In some states, a 
single act is sufficient to constitute bullying under the law if it is severe 
enough.52 Others states require repeated, but not necessarily very severe, 
acts to meet the legal definition of bullying.53  
The definitions of bullying also reflect some of the parameters of other 
laws. For example, because bullying is akin to harassment, and harassment 
is unlawful if it is based on a prohibited category and creates a hostile 
educational environment,54 a number of anti-bullying laws include acts 
that “create[] a hostile educational environment” as one definition of what 
constitutes bullying.55 Some laws go even further and define a hostile 
educational environment as one that is created by “substantially interfering 
with a student's educational benefits, opportunities, or performance, or 
with a student's physical or psychological well-being.”56  
Once a student has engaged in an act or acts that constitute bullying, 
the laws call for school intervention. This is where the anti-bullying laws 
fail to reflect the complexity of the bullying problem and its effects. When 
bullying occurs, all anti-bullying laws call for the bully to face some sort 
of discipline or consequences. Of the states, 36 do not identify any 
consequences or responses tailored to addressing the problem of bullying 
in particular, and thus they implicitly or explicitly focus the schools’ 
responses on school exclusion.57 Of those 36 states, 29 either explicitly or 
                                                                                                         
 52. E.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.28; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3.  
 53. E.g., ALA. CODE § 16-28B-3(2); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D. 
 54. Letter from Arne Duncan, supra note 46. The prohibited categories are 
race, color, national origin, sex, and disability. Id.  
 55. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14; see also, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-
514; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d(a)(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2(a). 
 56. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424(a)(2)(i) (West 2016). Other 
statutes, such as North Dakota’s anti-bullying statute, effectively define a hostile 
education environment without using that term. N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-
19-17(1)(a)(i) (West 2016). The North Dakota statute provides that behavior “so 
severe, pervasive, or objectively offensive that it substantially interferes with the 
student’s educational opportunities” constitutes bullying. Id.; see also Letter from 
Arne Duncan, supra note 46. 
 57. Those states are the following: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5; ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200(b) (West 2016); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341(A)(36) (2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514; CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) 




implicitly identify school exclusion as the sole or primary method of 
intervention when bullying takes place.58 The other seven states’ anti-
                                                                                                         
(effective Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
14, § 4112D(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4) (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 
20-2-751.4 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West 2016); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 280.28; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256(c) (West 2016); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 158.150 (West 2016); MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424; MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 380.1311 (West 2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-69 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 
2016); MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-201(2) (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
79-267 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4; N.M. CODE R. § 
6.12.7.7(c)(5) (LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 13 (McKinney 2016); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 115C-407.15(6)(b)(4) (West 2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 
15.1-19-18(2); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 339.356 (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-
A (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-16 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-
6-4503 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-301 (West 
2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570 (West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 
(West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
118.46 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West 2016). At least one 
study has found that generally school culture is resistant to alternatives to school 
exclusion because staff believe that problem behaviors should be punished, and 
students with problem behaviors should be served in segregated settings. Linda M. 
Barbara et al., Perceived Barriers and Enablers to Implementing Individualized 
Positive Behavior Interventions and Supports in School Settings, 25 J. POSITIVE 
BEHAVIOR INTERVENTIONS 1, 11 (2012). Thus in a state like Virginia, where the 
bullying statute is part of the student discipline code, or Utah, where the bullying 
statute calls for student discipline, the research suggests that schools and school 
culture will lead schools to use school exclusion as the response to bullying.  
 58. Those states are the following: Alaska, Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, 
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 6-18-514; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D; FLA. STAT. ANN § 
1006.147; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A; IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 280; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150; 
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1311; MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 121A.031; MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-67; MO. ANN. STAT. § 
160.775; MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-201(2); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-267; 
N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 11; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-
407.15; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666; 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-16; TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 49-6-4503; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201; VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 16, § 570; VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01; WASH. REV. CODE ANN, § 




bullying laws both implicitly focus on school exclusion and also identify 
additional, non-punitive approaches schools can take to address the effects 
of bullying on the bully, victim, or both, such as referring the involved 
students for counseling.59 However, the alternative steps supplement, but 
do not supplant, the punishment requirement and few, if any, require direct 
interventions by the schools.60 Relatively few states expressly identify 
alternative forms of discipline for bullying that could supplant school 
exclusion, such as the loss of privileges or extracurricular activities.61 Only 
                                                                                                         
28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 
118.46; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312. In Washington, the statute is at best vague 
about any responses schools must take when bullying happens. However, the model 
policy the statute requires be developed calls for corrective measures and 
contemplates those will include suspensions and expulsions because it refers to the 
aggressor’s appeal rights, which apply to suspensions and expulsions. Bullying and 
Harassment (HIB) Toolkit, OFF. OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUB. INSTRUCTION, 
http://www.k12.wa.us/Safetycenter/BullyingHarassment/default.aspx [https://perma. 
cc/FFY5-ESWK] (last updated Apr. 13, 2016); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 
28A.600.010, 28A.600.015, 28A.600.020, 28A.600.022. 
 59. Those states are the following: Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West 
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341; CAL. EDUC. 
CODE §§ 48900, 48900.5 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147; 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; 24 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2. Including 
Arizona in this group might constitute generosity. Arizona’s law states that 
provisions must be made for protecting the health and well-being of students who 
are harmed by bullying, but it limits those protections to students who are 
physically harmed. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341.  
 60. ALASKA STAT. § 14.33.200; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341; CAL. 
EDUC. CODE § 48900  (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective 
Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147; 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15; 24 PA. STAT. 
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2. 
 61. Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Nevada, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Rhode Island are among them. COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6 (LexisNexis 
2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7(b) (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 
17:416.13; 14:40.7 (2016); ME. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 71, § 370 (2016); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.1351 (West 2016); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(7); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4(A)(12) (2016); 16 R.I. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-34 (West 2016). 




two states’ anti-bullying laws require that the schools take any steps to 
address the effects of bullying on the victims.62  
This legal landscape, with the focus on discipline responses that are 
not tailored to the problem of bullying, such as school exclusion, reflects 
a limited response to the complicated problem of bullying. This disparate 
response calls to mind the quote from psychologist Abraham Maslow, “If 
the only tool you have is a hammer, [it is tempting] to treat everything as 
if it were a nail.”63 When the anti-bullying laws require schools to punish 
the bully, and traditional school discipline is the only identified means for 
doing so, then it is understandable that schools focus on school exclusion 
in response to bullying.  
1. Anti-Bullying Laws that Explicitly or Implicitly Focus on School 
Exclusion 
Of the 36 states that focus on punishing the bully and using school 
exclusion as the primary method of punishment, only a few do so 
explicitly.64 The remainder of states are more subtle, focusing on school 
exclusion without specifically naming it in the anti-bullying laws. In the 
few states that are explicit about school exclusion, anti-bullying laws 
provide that bullying is a ground for suspension, expulsion, or some other 
form of school exclusion.65 Alaska’s statute, for example, does not mince 
                                                                                                         
 62. Those states are South Carolina and Texas. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425 
(2016); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342 (West 2016). South Carolina’s 
protections are provided only in limited circumstances where a protective order 
has been granted the victim. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425. 
 63. David McRaney, Maslow’s Hammer: Are We Entering a New Phase in 
Anthropology?, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Mar. 27, 2012), https://www.psychologytoday 
.com/blog/you-are-not-so-smart/201203/maslows-hammer [https://perma.cc/BL3F-
3RGW].  
 64. Those states are Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, and Nebraska. ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 14.33.200; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§§ 18-917A, 33-205 (West 2016); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 79-267 (West 2016). 
In addition, Kentucky’s anti-bullying law is part of the state’s criminal code. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158-150 (West 2016). As bullying in Kentucky is punishable 
as a misdemeanor, meaning bullying is punishable by confinement not in a 
penitentiary, which would effectively involve school exclusion, the author 
includes it in this category. Id. § 431.060. Idaho’s anti-bullying law is also part of 
its criminal code, but the punishment does not result in confinement upon 
conviction. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 18-111, 18-917A. 
 65. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200; GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4; IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-917A; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.150; NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 79-267. 




words in this respect. It states that schools’ anti-bullying policies “must . . . 
include provisions for an appropriate punishment schedule up to and 
including expulsion.”66 Although Alaska’s law does not make clear what 
those other appropriate punishments are, it clearly states that expulsion is 
appropriate and should be considered.67 Georgia’s anti-bullying law goes 
even further and leaves no room for discretion when using school exclusion 
in response to bullying. Upon the third instance of bullying by a student in 
grades 6 through 12, the Georgia anti-bullying law requires “such student 
[to] be assigned to an alternative school.”68  
Although anti-bullying laws are less explicit in the other states, 
discipline—often meaning school exclusion—is nonetheless present.69 In 
these states, the anti-bullying laws all call for schools to impose “discipline” 
or “consequences” on students when they bully.70 In other words, the anti-
                                                                                                         
 66. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 14.33.200.  
 67. Id. 
 68. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(b)(1).  
 69. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-1, et seq. (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 
(2016); ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (West 2016); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 
(West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 (West) (effective Jan. 1, 
2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 
§ 4112D (West 2016); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 280 (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West 2016); MD. CODE 
ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1310b (West 
2016); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.031 (West 2016); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-
67 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 160.775 (West 2016); Bully-Free Montana 
Act, 2015 Mont. Laws 253 (codified at MONT. CODE ANN. § 20-5-207 through § 
20-5-210 (West 2016)); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18A:37-15 (West 2016); N.M. CODE R. § 6.12.7.7 (LexisNexis 2016); N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 11 (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 115C-407.15 (West 
2016); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 15.1-19-17 (West 2016); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3313.666 (West 2016); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.356 (West 2016); 24 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 13-32-16 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4502 (West 2016); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §§ 53A-11a-102, 53A-11a-201 (West 2016); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 570 
(West 2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-276.01 (West 2016); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 28A.300.285 (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-2 (West 2016); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.46 (West 2016); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-4-312 (West 
2016). 
 70. For example, Ohio’s statute requires schools to have a “disciplinary 
procedure for any student guilty of . . . bullying.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.666. 
Vermont’s statute calls for “consequences or appropriate remedial action.” VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 16, § 570c(5). Again, although not every statute uses the precise language 
“discipline” or “consequences,” the states use similar and similarly vague, apparently 
discretionary language. For example, in Washington, the model anti-bullying policy 




bullying laws in these states call for schools to discipline the bully, and by 
failing to provide any potential methods for accomplishing this discipline, 
the laws indicate that schools need to respond to bullying in the same way 
that the schools respond to any other form of student discipline. Nationwide 
statistics show that school administrators respond to serious student 
disciplinary problems by excluding students from school.71 Across the 
country, the number of suspensions has more than doubled since the 
1970s.72 In 2011–2012, the years for which aggregate disciplinary numbers 
are most recently available, there were almost 3,200,000 suspensions and 
more than 110,000 expulsions.73 School exclusion is happening at such high 
rates that the National School Boards Association has called the situation a 
“crisis.”74 Although school discipline statistics do not disaggregate on the 
                                                                                                         
calls for “corrective measures.” Featured Policies, WASH. ST. SCH. DIRECTORS’ 
ASS’N, http://www.wssda.org/PolicyLegal/FeaturedPolicies.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
DV3G-8ULA] (last visited Jan. 30, 2016) (follow the “Procedure” hyperlink under 
“3207–Prohibition of Harassment, Intimidation and Bullying (including 
Cyberbullying)”). See also Bullying and Harassment (HIB) Toolkit, supra note 58; 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 28A.600.010, 28A.600.015, 28A.600.020, 28A.600.022. 
In Wyoming, the statute prohibits bullying in school, thus making it a violation of the 
school rules. It does not state specifically that students are therefore subject to 
discipline, but any violation of a school rule can result in discipline, including 
suspensions and expulsions. U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., COMPENDIUM OF SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE LAWS AND REGULATIONS FOR THE 50 STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 
AND UNITED STATES TERRITORIES 4111 (2016), http://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov 
/sites/default/files/discipline-compendium/School%20Discipline%20Laws%20and 
%20Regulations%20Compendium.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYL2-9VA3] [hereinafter 
COMPENDIUM]. Indeed, some bullying laws simply direct schools to the student code 
of conduct to determine the disciplinary measures that should be imposed when 
students bully. Id. As noted above, although Kentucky and Idaho’s anti-bullying laws 
do not call for school exclusion, the consequences for bullying there can be even more 
serious than the ones required in Georgia. McRaney, supra note 63 and accompanying 
text.  
 71. MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF 
EDUCATION 2009, at 70 (2009), http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009081.pdf [https: 
//perma.cc/7D8X-5AXT]. 
 72. Perry & Morris, supra note 5, at 1070.  
 73. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 233.30, DIG. OF EDUC. STATS., 
https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233.30.asp [https://perma. 
cc/EK8N-62J9] (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). 
 74. NAT’L. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, ADDRESSING THE OUT-OF-SCHOOL SUSPENSION 
CRISIS 2 (2013), https://www.nsba.org/sites/default/files/0413NSBA-Out-Of-School-
Suspension-School-Board-Policy-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7TE-R89T] (stating 
that during the 2009–2010 school year, 3.3 million students were issued out-of-school 
suspensions). 




basis of bullying, given the increase in school exclusion as a method of 
school discipline, there is little reason to think that schools will treat an 
incidence of bullying any differently than they do any other school 
disciplinary matter, especially when lacking any guidance in the anti-
bullying laws for responding differently.75 It stands to reason, then, that 
even in the states that allow for schools to use their discretion in imposing 
consequences or discipline when bullying occurs, schools will use the 
methods of school exclusion that they increasingly have used. 
Additionally, to the extent schools in these states have any guidance 
with respect to how to respond to bullying, guidance is found in general 
student discipline laws and regulations.76 The only methods of discipline 
                                                                                                         
 75. The statistics that disaggregate the rise in suspensions and expulsions do 
disaggregate based on type of offense—the number of offenses in the disaggregation 
is small and does not include bullying. Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Table 233.10, 
DIG. OF EDUC. STATS., https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_233 
.10.asp [https://perma.cc/T3YE-FUH3] (last visited Dec. 13, 2016). Although it can 
be argued that perhaps these numbers of suspensions and expulsions do not implicate 
bullying on a large scale because the statistics do not disaggregate on the basis of 
bulling, it is hard to imagine given the implicit and sometimes explicit focus on school 
exclusion in the anti-bullying laws that they do not. To illustrate the go-to nature of 
school exclusion in the eyes of schools, one need only look to one school’s response 
to why they should not be liable for student-on-student gender-based harassment in 
the case of Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). There 
the school argued they should not be liable for such harassment under Title IX 
because then in order to prevent such liability, schools would have to then require 
“nothing short of expulsion of every student accused of misconduct involving 
sexual overtones.” Id. at 648 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 16, Davis v. Monroe 
Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (No. 97-843), 1998 WL 847573). The 
Supreme Court made clear that such measures were not required to avoid liability 
and the schools only needed to “respond . . . in a manner that is not clearly 
unreasonable.” Id. at 649. That the schools argued expulsion was their only recourse 
demonstrates that it serves as their go-to response when confronted with serious 
student disciplinary problems like harassment, which bears a strong relationship to, 
and sometimes overlaps with, bullying. 
 76. In part, school discipline laws single out school exclusion because they 
implicate students’ procedural due process rights. In Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme 
Court concluded that schools cannot suspend and expel students from school 
without at least some minimal due process. 419 U.S. 565, 580–81 (1975). 
Following Goss, states discipline laws spell out the process required before 
schools can suspend or expel students. For example, North Carolina has a 
subsection of its education code devoted to school discipline procedures, but they 
cover suspensions, expulsions, and subsequent readmissions. N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 115C-390.1-393 (2016). By singling out specific disciplinary measures 




identified in the general student discipline laws in these states are methods 
of school exclusion.77 Imagine that a principal or other school 
administrator in one of these states was to consider what punishment to 
use in the face of a serious case of bullying. Looking at the potential 
options in the relevant state disciplinary rules, that administrator would 
find school exclusion methods as the only identified options for addressing 
serious student disciplinary issues. It would be reasonable for that 
administrator to conclude that school exclusion is an appropriate, and 
perhaps the most appropriate, response to address a serious problem. 
Given the lack of alternative methods for addressing serious bullying, 
school exclusion can look like the only option.  
Admittedly, in some of these states that call for schools to simply 
impose “discipline” or “consequences” on the bully, the anti-bullying laws 
also identify some other interventions that schools could use in addition to 
punishing the bully.78 However, all of these interventions are discretionary 
and do not relieve schools of their responsibility to punish the bully. 
Furthermore, the additional interventions identified in these nine states’ 
anti-bullying laws require little of the schools in terms of providing any 
actual services to students. For example, in New Jersey, schools “may” 
provide intervention services or order counseling.79 In California, schools 
“may refer” the bully or victim for counseling.80 In Florida, schools need 
                                                                                                         
without identifying any others, the laws not only follow Goss’s requirements, they 
also suggest the appropriateness of school exclusion as a response.  
 77. All states have laws that define the meaning of certain methods of school 
exclusion. The laws usually define “long-term suspension” and “expulsion,” as 
well as the process required for excluding a student from school by suspension 
and expulsion. See generally COMPENDIUM, supra note 70. 
 78. The states with those alternatives are Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Connecticut, Florida, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West 
Virginia. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5 (2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-341 (2016); 
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.9 (West 2016) (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2016); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:4 
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(7) (West 2016); 24 PA. STAT. AND CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 13-1303.1-A (West 2016); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2C-3 (West 
2016). Including Alabama in this list is arguably generous. The Alabama statute 
requires a graduated set of consequences for bullying, which could include 
alternatives to school exclusion, but the statute does not explicitly call for or 
require them. ALA. CODE § 16-28B-5.  
 79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(6). 
 80. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.9 (amended by 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. 95 
(West) (effective Jan. 1, 2017)). 




to have a procedure for referring victims of bullying to counseling.81 
Significantly, though, a referral for counseling amounts to little more than 
providing the student or the student’s parents with information. It does not 
mean that a victim of bullying will receive counseling. Thus, despite 
language invoking alternative forms of interventions, the anti-bullying 
laws in those states effectively require little or no direct intervention by 
the schools other than traditional discipline, often meaning school 
exclusion, for the bully. 
2. Anti-Bullying Laws that Identify Alternatives to School Exclusion 
Only a few states’ anti-bullying laws specifically identify some 
alternative consequence for the bully that could serve as a guide for 
schools and could supplant school exclusion as a disciplinary method.82 
Two additional states require schools to take affirmative steps to protect 
the victim.83 In the states that identify alternative forms of discipline in 
their anti-bullying laws, some single out methods such as the loss of 
privileges or extracurricular activities as disciplinary methods schools 
could use to address bullying.84 Others suggest a broader range of 
possibilities.85 Illinois’s anti-bullying law suggests schools can respond to 
bullying by providing social work services, mediation, restorative justice, 
and skill building and counseling, among other methods.86 Although not 
all of these options may be effective, and indeed some are not effective in 
the bullying context, the laws in these states at least offer alternative—
though still bully-focused—approaches for schools to consider other than 
school exclusion.87  
                                                                                                         
 81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147(4)(j). 
 82. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (West 2016); HAW. CODE R. § 8-
19-2 (LexisNexis 2016); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7 (West 2016); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 20-33-8-0.2 (West 2016); LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:40.7, 17:416 (2016); ME. 
STAT. tit. 20-A, § 6554 (2016); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 370 (2016); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 388.123 (West 2016); OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (2016); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-34 (West 2016). 
 83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425 (Supp. 2013); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 
37.0342 (West 2016). 
 84. Hawaii, for example, cites a range of potential consequences including loss 
of privileges and parent conferences. HAW. CODE R. § 8-19-6. 
 85. Colorado’s statute identifies mediation, restorative justice, and counseling 
as options for responding to bullying. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1. 
 86. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/27-23.7. 
 87. Some of the alternative methods for addressing bullying in these laws can 
be counter-productive. Infra Part III.A.  




In South Carolina and Texas, the anti-bullying laws give victims 
affirmative rights to an intervention addressing bullying. Specifically, 
victims in South Carolina and Texas have the right to transfer schools 
because of bullying.88 However, in South Carolina, that victim-transfer 
right only exists if a court orders it.89 In Texas, the right is not so limited. 
If a parent of a victim of bullying requests that the victim be transferred to 
a new school, the law requires the transfer to occur.90  
The states that offer alternative approaches to discipline in their anti-
bullying laws or that require schools to assist the victim represent fewer 
than a quarter of the states. Of course, the punitive approach to bullying in 
general, and school exclusion in particular, has its appeal. Certainly there 
is value in teaching students who bully a lesson by way of discipline. If 
nothing else, it teaches that the behavior is unacceptable. To the extent that 
schools punish students who bully through school exclusion, the schools 
at least theoretically stop the bullying from occurring in the short-term.91 
The point of this discussion is not to deny that the approach in the anti-
bullying laws lacks some appeal. Instead, the point is simply to explain 
that the approach is limited and focused on school exclusion. However, 
the punitive, school-exclusion focused approach to bullying does have its 
problems.  
II. STUDENT SPEECH AND SCHOOLS’ AUTHORITY TO SUPPRESS IT 
Not only are the anti-bullying laws limited in their response to 
bullying, but the laws also often implicate the First Amendment. Much of 
the bullying that occurs among students is verbal or written, including 
electronic writings and postings.92 That is, most bullying constitutes 
speech. One study found that verbal bullying occurred more than twice as 
often as physical bullying.93 When public schools impose consequences 
                                                                                                         
 88. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342. 
 89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-425. 
 90. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 25:0342. 
 91. This effect is more dubious in the case of cyberbullying, which can occur 
anywhere. Even if a bully is removed from school, the bully can still send bullying 
messages electronically. If the victim receives those messages at school, then the 
bullying has at least in part happened at school.  
 92. Wang et al., supra note 25, at 372. 
 93. Id. The same study found that social, or relational, bullying, which 
includes behaviors such as spreading rumors, also occurs more than twice as 
frequently as physical bullying. Id. In addition, 13.6% reported experiencing 
cyberbullying, which occurs in electronic written form. Id. Of the students 
surveyed in that study, all of whom were ages six to ten, 53.6% reported 




on students who engage in bullying, the schools are often suppressing 
student speech. Therefore, those consequences and the laws that allow for 
them implicate the First Amendment.94 To impose any consequences for 
bullying that is speech, schools then must satisfy First Amendment 
constraints. 
In assessing the application of the First Amendment in the public 
school context, the Supreme Court has provided schools more latitude to 
suppress student speech than other state actors.95 However, that latitude is 
not unlimited. Laws calling for the suppression of student speech are still 
subject to First Amendment limits based on overbreadth and must comply 
with even the deferential standards for the suppression of student speech.96 
In describing those standards, this Part also explores the rationale for the 
deference afforded schools and the analytic framework that forms that 
rationale. That rationale and the framework for it serve not only an 
important explanatory function, but also as a point for analysis itself.  
A. Overly Broad Restrictions on Student Speech 
Statutes giving schools authority to suppress student speech for 
disciplinary purposes can run afoul of the First Amendment on the basis 
of overbreadth.97 A law facially violates the First Amendment because of 
overbreadth if “there is a ‘likelihood that the statute’s very existence will 
inhibit free expression’ by ‘inhibiting the speech of third parties who are 
                                                                                                         
experiencing verbal bullying, and 51.4% reported experiencing social bullying. 
Id. A comparatively small percentage of students, 20.8%, reported physical 
bullying. Id. Although 20% of students reporting physical bullying still represents 
a large number, and even a small percentage of students experiencing physical 
bullying is too many, the number pales in comparison to the number of students 
who report experiencing bullying in verbal, written, or electronic form.  
 94. At first blush, it may seem disconcerting to think that bullying could be 
protected speech at all. Certainly a reasonable reaction to speech that is as harmful 
as bullying is that it cannot possibly be protected under the First Amendment. 
However, bullying restrictions limit speech on the basis of its content, and the 
First Amendment requires that content-based restrictions undergo strict scrutiny. 
U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012); Barry McDonald, Regulating 
Student Cyberspeech, 77 MO. L. REV. 727, 731 (2012).  
 95. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding 
that school authorities may suppress speech if the speech would reasonably lead 
them to “forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school 
activities”). 
 96. Infra Part II.A–B. 
 97. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)). 




not before the Court.’”98 In addition, “the overbreadth must be ‘not only 
real but substantial in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”99 
Before concluding a law is overbroad on these bases, a court must 
determine first “whether it is susceptible to a reasonable limiting 
construction” and in so doing “every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to.”100 
Using these standards, the Third Circuit assessed an early anti-
bullying law in Saxe v. State College Area School District and struck down 
the law prohibiting harassment in schools as overbroad and vague.101 The 
law prohibited “verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or 
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, 
disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or 
effect of substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance 
or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.”102 Students 
whose Christian beliefs held homosexuality immoral and called for them 
to speak out about it challenged the law.103  
The Third Circuit concluded that the law was unconstitutionally 
overbroad for several reasons. First, it covered unwelcomed conduct or 
speech based on characteristics not protected by federal law, such as 
personal characteristics like appearance, regardless of whether that speech 
was political or religious.104 Second, it prohibited speech that had the 
“purpose” of harassing regardless of whether it rose to the level of 
harassment.105 As such, it banned what could amount to simple name-
calling. Simple name-calling is protected, if “odious,” speech.106 Third, it 
banned speech no matter where it occurred, including private speech that 
simply “happens to occur on the school premises.”107  
Nonetheless, the court also considered whether the law could be 
subject to any limiting construction that might save it from being struck 
down on overbreadth grounds or met the deferential standards applied to 
school suppression of student speech or could be saved as applied.108 With 
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 99. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)). 
 100. Id. at 215.  
 101. Id. at 201. 
 102. Id. at 202. 
 103. Id. at 215.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 216–17. 
 106. Id. at 210. 
 107. Id. at 216 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
271 (1988)). 
 108. Id. at 215. 




respect to overbreadth, the court stated that even under the narrowest 
construction of the law, it prohibited “(1) verbal or physical conduct (2) 
that is based on one’s actual or perceived personal characteristics and (3) 
that has the purpose or effect of either (3a) substantially interfering with a 
student’s educational performance or (3b) creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive environment.”109 Because even this construction still 
allowed for the suppression of speech unprotected by federal law, 
irrespective of whether it rose to the level of harassment and wherever it 
occurred, the court concluded that the law failed on overbreadth grounds. 
The court also concluded that the law could not be saved as applied 
because it did not comport with the standards for school suppression of 
student speech as set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School 
District or any of the ensuing Supreme Court cases allowing for the 
suppression of certain kinds of student speech.110 Therefore, the court 
struck the law down as unconstitutional. 
B. The Deferential Standards for the Suppression of Student Speech by 
the Public Schools 
Although the Supreme Court has decided several First Amendment 
cases in the school context, four of them directly address student-generated 
speech. Of those four, Tinker sets the general standard and courts have 
treated the rest as exceptions to that standard.111 As Saxe suggests, even 
laws directing schools to suppress speech can be overbroad, but 
nonetheless constitutional, if they are saved, at least as applied, by the 
Tinker test or one of its exceptions set forth in its progeny. The review of 
the cases that follow includes not only an analysis of the deferential 
standards for the suppression of student speech, but also the bases for that 
deference because they are inextricably related.  
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District 
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the 
Supreme Court famously declared that students do not “shed their 
constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate.”112 At the same time, 
though, the Court made clear that those constitutional rights are not 
coextensive with constitutional rights in other contexts.113 The Court’s 
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rationale for finding that students do not enjoy full constitutional 
protections in schools lies in its understandings of the work of the schools. 
The Tinker case arose in the midst of the Vietnam War. The students 
in the case, John and Mary Beth Tinker, then ages 15 and 13, respectively, 
and a third student, Christopher Eckhardt, then age 16, objected to the 
war.114 To demonstrate their objections, the three wore black armbands to 
school in violation of a school policy prohibiting the wearing of 
armbands.115 As a result, the principals of their schools suspended them 
until they came to school without the armbands.116 Mary Beth, John, and 
Christopher appealed their suspensions on First Amendment grounds.117  
The Supreme Court found that the schools violated the students’ First 
Amendment rights.118 In so finding, it set forth a standard for when those 
First Amendment rights could be infringed on by schools. The Court held 
that schools cannot suppress student speech without “reason to anticipate 
that [the speech] would substantially interfere with the work of the school 
or impinge upon the rights of other students.”119 Noting that the school 
cannot suppress student speech merely on the basis of an “undifferentiated 
fear or apprehension of disturbance,” it found no substantial interference 
with the schools’ work on the facts in Tinker and overturned lower court 
decisions upholding the schools’ actions.120 
That schools can suppress student speech if the schools anticipate that 
it will cause a substantial disruption or impinge on other students’ rights 
means that the schools have more authority to limit student speech than do 
other state entities.121 Outside the school context, the government cannot 
suppress speech simply because it might be disruptive.122 However, in 
schools, the Court has held that students’ constitutional rights, and 
specifically in Tinker their First Amendment rights, are “applied in light 
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 119. Id. at 509. 
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 121. The Supreme Court is particularly explicit about this point in the 
subsequent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick, where it states the 
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the school context . . . would have been protected.” 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007). 
 122. Generally, speech cannot be suppressed unless it falls into a protected 
category. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.  




of the special characteristics of the school.”123 Herein lies the Court’s basis 
for finding that students do not enjoy the full force of the Constitution’s 
First Amendment protections in school—the “special characteristics” of 
school. The public schools, then, effectively have enhanced authority to 
suppress student speech because of their special characteristics. Schools 
can use that authority when they have “reason to anticipate that [the 
speech] would substantially interfere with the work of the school or 
impinge on the rights of other students.”124 However, anticipating these 
events is a trigger for the authority’s use, not its basis. The schools’ special 
characteristics provide that basis.  
The Court also identified in Tinker some of what it understands those 
special characteristics to be. The Court said that schools are “educating the 
young for citizenship.”125 It also stated that schools are the “marketplace 
of ideas” and places where students will participate in a “robust exchange 
of ideas.”126 Finally, the Court made clear that this exchange of ideas is 
not one that is “confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which 
takes place in the classroom.”127 Instead, “[t]he principal use to which the 
schools are dedicated is to accommodate students . . . for the purpose of 
certain types of activities,” including “personal intercommunication” be 
that “in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus.”128 Thus, 
in Tinker the Court made clear that it understands schools’ roles to be 
broader than just academic, and that those roles justify the deference 
schools have to suppress student speech.  
2. The Post-Tinker Cases 
The Supreme Court has decided three student speech cases since 
Tinker.129 These cases, Bethel School District v. Fraser, Hazelwood 
                                                                                                         
 123. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. The Court has also since found that other 
constitutional rights are not applied with the same force in school, including Fourth 
Amendment rights. For example, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court concluded that 
a student’s Fourth Amendment rights protecting them from unreasonable searches 
are lesser in the school context. 469 U.S. 325, 340–41 (1985). 
 124. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
 125. Id. at 507 (quoting West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)). 
 126. Id. at 512 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1937)).  
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 512–13. 
 129. The Court also decided two other First Amendment school case post-
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did not involve the suppression of student speech. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 
68 (1979); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). 




School District v. Kuhlmeier, and Morse v. Frederick, depart from Tinker 
in that the cases assess school authority to suppress a particular type or 
category of speech.130 In each case, the Court found that schools have the 
authority to suppress certain types of speech categorically without regard 
for whether the speech would cause a substantial disruption or be injurious 
to the rights of others and all for reasons relating to the work that the Court 
understands schools to do and the type of speech involved.131  
In Bethel School District v. Fraser, the Court upheld the suspension 
of a student, Matthew Fraser, for giving a lewd speech at school.132 Fraser 
challenged his suspension on First Amendment grounds. The district court 
and the Ninth Circuit found that the suspension violated his First 
Amendment rights.133 The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts’ 
decisions. It concluded that schools could suppress lewd student speech as 
a categorical matter without respect to whether it could cause the schools 
to anticipate a substantial disruption or be injurious to the rights of 
others.134 To the point, the Court stated, “The First Amendment does not 
prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a vulgar and 
lewd speech such as respondent’s would undermine the school's basic 
educational mission.”135 
In the process, the Court again noted that students’ First Amendment 
rights are different and lesser than individuals’ rights outside of school, 
albeit without specifically referring to schools’ special characteristics.136 
Nevertheless, to justify the categorical suppression of student lewd speech, 
the Court relied on its understanding of the schools’ work. The Court said 
that the purpose of public schools is “the inculcat[ion of] fundamental 
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”137 
It also identified some of those values as it perceives them. The Court said 
those values “must, of course, include tolerance of divergent political and 
religious views,” and they “must also take into account consideration of 
the sensibilities of others.”138 In addition to elaborating on some of the 
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specific values schools “must” be teaching, the Court also identified other 
teaching functions of schools.139 It stated that society has an interest in 
having students learn “the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior” 
because “a democratic society requires consideration for the personal 
sensibilities . . . of other[s].”140  
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a school 
principal deleted two stories from a school newspaper, one about student 
pregnancy and the other about divorce.141 Three student newspaper staff 
members challenged the deletion of the stories, arguing the action violated 
their First Amendment rights.142 In upholding the actions of the principal 
against the First Amendment challenge, the Court relied on a distinction 
between when the First Amendment requires schools to tolerate student 
speech and when it requires schools to promote or endorse it.143 In the case 
of the latter category of speech, the Court concluded that schools have 
even more authority under the First Amendment to suppress student 
speech than when the school is merely tolerating student speech.144 As 
long as the suppression of speech in school-sponsored expressive activities 
is “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,” it does not 
offend the First Amendment.145 Finding that the deletion of the articles in 
the school newspaper met that standard, the Court held the principal’s 
actions constitutional.146 Here too, the Court asserted the notion that “the 
First Amendment rights of students in the public schools ‘are not 
automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’ and 
must be ‘applied in light of the special characteristics of the school 
environment.’”147 Kuhlmeier thus reflects the significance of this rationale 
regarding the characteristics and work of the public schools on the Court’s 
jurisprudence regarding school authority to suppress student speech. 
The Court’s most recent student speech case, Morse v. Frederick, is 
perhaps more famously known as the “bong hits for Jesus” case because 
the student in the case, Joseph Frederick, held up a banner that said 
“BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” while attending the Olympic torch relay with his 
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classmates during the school day.148 When the principal, Deborah Morse, 
told Frederick to take the banner down, he refused and was suspended.149 
Frederick appealed the suspension, arguing it violated his First 
Amendment rights.150 The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed, though its 
holding was narrow.151 The Court determined that schools are allowed 
under the First Amendment “to restrict student expression that they 
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”152 
In Morse, the Court was explicit about the nature of schools’ work and 
its relationship to the deference the schools receive to categorically 
suppress a particular type of student speech—student drug-promoting 
speech.153 The Court stated that the school’s role and “governmental 
interest in stopping student drug abuse” more specifically allows schools 
to prohibit speech like Frederick’s.154 The Court noted that both Congress 
and “thousands of school boards throughout the country—including 
[Frederick’s]—have adopted policies aimed at” educating students about 
the dangers of drug use.155 Those policies coupled with strong evidence of 
the reality and seriousness of student drug abuse led the Court to view 
schools as having a role in preventing drug use and in “working to protect 
those entrusted to their care from the dangers of drug abuse.”156 Thus, 
while the holding and rationale are limited, the Court still indicated that 
when a danger, like drug abuse, is real and pervasive, and when local and 
federal governments have adopted strong policies aimed at addressing the 
problem, it understands schools as having a legitimate role in working to 
address the problem and therefore can suppress student speech as a means 
of fulfilling it.  
C. Deconstructing Deference: The Relationship Between the Supreme 
Court’s Understanding of Schools’ Work and Public Schools’ Deference 
to Suppress Student Speech 
Morse, similar to Fraser and Tinker before it, demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work is a critical component 
of its rationale for affording schools deference in suppressing student 
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speech.157 However, the schools’ role is not the only piece of the analysis 
that gives rise to this deference. These student speech cases, with the 
possible exception of Kuhlmeier, follow a particular analytic framework 
that involves not just a reliance on a particular understanding of schools’ 
work, but also an analysis of the schools’ role with respect to a general or 
a particular category of speech. That relationship provides the justification 
for the amount of deference that schools receive to suppress the speech.158  
Thus, in Tinker, the Court analyzed student speech that expressed a 
viewpoint—any viewpoint—and schools’ role, as the Court understood it, 
with respect to students’ expression of views. The Court said that schools’ 
roles generally involved educating students for participation as citizens in 
the democratic political system.159 To this end, the Court noted that 
classrooms serve as a marketplace for ideas—places where students can 
exchange ideas and express views just as citizens debate politics.160 In 
Tinker, the Court acknowledged that to carry out this teaching schools also 
                                                                                                         
 157. This analysis regarding the Court’s basis for giving deference to schools 
builds upon other work analyzing deference more generally. Paul Horwitz, in his 
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educators.” Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1061, 1088 (2008) (arguing for the need to fully understand deference and how it is 
used in order to recognize how it has been misused). See also Erwin Chemerinsky, 
The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 455–58 
(1999). The analysis here further deconstructs the basis for the deference given to 
schools and argues that the general expertise of educators alone does not justify it, 
but their expertise as related to particular work the Court understands them to do.  
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Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (quoting Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 76–
77 (1979)). 
 160. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603). 




need to maintain order.161 Thus, the Court balanced two of the schools’ 
roles—their role in maintaining order in school and their role in teaching 
students to participate as citizens in the democracy—with the type of 
speech—generally expressive speech. Given the type of speech and the 
Court’s understanding of the schools’ role in relation to it, the Court 
allowed schools to suppress student speech only if schools could anticipate 
that it would substantially disrupt their work or be injurious to the rights 
of others. Tinker also provided the general standard for the suppression of 
student speech because the case did not analyze a particular type of speech 
or expression. Rather, it simply addressed student expression in general. 
Thus, courts have applied the Tinker standard as the general standard in 
student speech cases.162 The Court’s subsequent student speech cases, 
which assess school suppression of particular types of speech, serve as 
exceptions to the Tinker standard.163  
In Fraser, the Court described two specific school functions as they 
related to a particular category of speech, lewd student speech, and used that 
relationship as a basis for giving schools a certain amount of deference, 
categorical deference, to suppress that lewd speech. First, the Court 
explained that schools provide instruction in “fundamental values of ‘habits 
and manners of civility.’”164 It went further to state specifically that the 
values schools must teach are “tolerance of divergent political and religious 
views” and “consideration of the sensibilities of others.”165 Second, the 
Court also said that society has an interest in schools teaching students “the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”166 Consequently, the Court 
concluded that schools have the authority to suppress all lewd speech by 
students.167 The nature and necessity of teaching these values and skills in 
addition to the role of schools, given the type of speech, justifies the 
deference to suppress the student speech as a categorical matter, irrespective 
of whether it is disruptive or injurious. 
Similarly, in Morse, the Court identified a particular role for schools as 
it relates to a particular category of speech—drug-promoting speech—that 
justified deference to schools to suppress it categorically.168 In the context 
of the problem of illegal drug use, the Court identified schools as having 
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a protective role over students.169 It stated that schools have this role 
because of three factors, one involving the nature of the drug problem and 
two involving the policy response to it.170 First, the drug problem was 
widespread.171 Second, the federal government had policies placing 
responsibility for combatting the drug problem on schools.172 Third, local 
school districts had also all developed policies to combat the drug 
problem.173 As schools have this protective function in the context of the 
problem of illegal drug use, the Court concluded that schools are to be 
given the deference to categorically suppress a particular type of speech—
drug-promoting speech—without regard for whether it might cause a 
disruption in school or injure another’s rights.  
Thus, a strong relationship exists between the Court’s understanding 
of schools’ work vis-à-vis the type of student speech and the deference it 
gives schools to suppress that student speech. Although the Court has 
never prescribed any particular role for the schools, and arguably can 
never do so, the Court’s understanding of schools’ roles as they relate to 
general or specific types of student speech provides the basis for the 
amount of deference schools receive to suppress that speech. Therefore, in 
these student speech cases, the Court not only adopts this framework in 
which the deference afforded the schools to suppress speech depends on 
the type of speech and the schools’ relationship to it, but in doing so the 
Court also reflects its conceptions about the work of schools, which can 
itself serve as a point for analyzing laws allowing or calling for the 
suppression of student speech.174  
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III. EXPOSING THE FLAWS: ANALYZING THE ANTI-BULLYING 
LAWS IN LIGHT OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT  
Analyzing the anti-bullying laws in light of the First Amendment 
proscriptions on overbreadth, the deferential standards for school suppression 
of student speech, and the rationale underlying that deference reveals the laws 
are at times arguably unconstitutional or problematic on all fronts. At least 
some of the laws give way to an argument that they are unconstitutionally 
overbroad. In some instances, if applied to bullying, they would be 
unconstitutional as applied under even the deferential Tinker standard. Almost 
none, if any, align with the Court’s understanding of the schools’ work that 
underlies that deference with their limited, almost total, focus on school 
exclusion.  
A. Anti-Bullying Laws that are Arguably Unconstitutionally Overbroad 
on Their Face 
Many of the anti-bullying laws define bullying by capturing the forms 
it can take and the effect it has.175 In what is likely an effort to cover the 
maximum amount of bullying and despite an effort to recognize the 
strictures of harassment law, at least some of the anti-bullying laws 
resemble very closely the law found unconstitutionally overbroad in 
Saxe.176 For example, Rhode Island’s anti-bullying law prohibits any 
“written, verbal, or electronic expression or physical act or gesture . . . that 
causes physical or emotional harm to the student.”177 The law goes on to 
state that “the expression, physical act or gesture may include, but is not 
limited to, an incident or incidents that may be reasonably perceived as 
being motivated by . . . any . . . distinguishing characteristic.”178 Thus, in 
Rhode Island, as with the Pennsylvania law in Saxe, the law arguably 
prohibits mere name-calling about characteristics that are not protected by 
federal law because calling someone a name like “ugly” is an expression 
and arguably about a distinguishing characteristic.179 Although, as the 
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Third Circuit noted in Saxe, these sorts of expression may be “odious,” 
that does not make them suppressible.180 The law also prohibits that speech 
regardless of whether it rises to the level of harassment or any particular 
level of harm.181 As the law only requires the expression to cause 
emotional harm, without identifying that the expression even amounts to 
any particular degree of harm, the law also does not protect against 
harassment or expression that would deprive the object of any educational 
benefits.182 Because it prohibits the expression anywhere on school 
premises,183 the law also prohibits even private expression in the hallways 
between classes. As such, the law meets the criteria set forth in Saxe for 
finding that Pennsylvania law overbroad. Further, the law is not saved by 
any limiting construction because on its face, the law allows for the 
suppression of “any” expression causing any amount of harm wherever it 
occurs.  
Similarly, Minnesota’s anti-bullying law prohibits any “harming” 
conduct, including electronic written expression, that is directed at a 
student based on a characteristic of that student.184 Thus, it also prohibits 
expression that is not protected by federal law, that does not rise to the 
level of harassment or deprive a student of educational benefit, and that is 
privately conducted in places such as outside of class and in the hallways. 
In other words, the law also prohibits name-calling, such as calling another 
student “ugly.” As such, both Minnesota’s and Rhode Island’s anti-
bullying laws could arguably be said to be unconstitutional on their face 
in light of the analysis applied to a similar law in Pennsylvania. 
Minnesota’s law is also not rendered constitutional by any limiting 
construction because no reading of the law avoids the suppression of “any” 
harming conduct no matter how harmful or where it occurs. Although Saxe 
is one of the few cases analyzing a harassment or anti-bullying law for 
overbreadth and thus its reasoning might not be applied across the circuits, 
it nonetheless supports the argument that some of the anti-bullying laws 
arguably violate the First Amendment.185 
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B. Anti-Bullying Laws that Could Violate the Tinker Standard as Applied 
Some of the anti-bullying laws might be, as Saxe suggests, saved by 
Tinker. If in the application the anti-bullying laws prohibited expression 
that could reasonably be said to have caused a school to anticipate a 
substantial disruption or injury to the rights of others, then the First 
Amendment might be satisfied.186 Yet, another flaw in the laws is exposed, 
which could, in conjunction with the limitations on what the laws call for 
schools to do, explain how the anti-bullying law in place in Nevada when 
Hailee Lamberth was bullied did not protect her. The Tinker standard does 
not allow schools to punish all bullying.  
Recall that in the case of Hailee Lamberth the bullying involved 
individual and repeated incidences of name-calling, including “fat” and 
“ugly.”187 Students called her these names at one time and then again at 
another time and repeated this behavior over a period of time. No single 
incident of calling Hailee fat or ugly likely rose to the level of causing a 
substantial disruption to the work of the school or was injurious to Hailee’s 
rights. The bullying that Hailee experienced consisted of micro-aggressions, 
none of which, if individually suppressed by the school, could meet the 
Tinker standard. It simply strains credulity to argue that any one instance of 
these micro-aggressions caused a substantial disruption in school. Calling 
Hailee “ugly” one time might have upset her, but it is hard to make the case 
that such a one-time instance substantially disrupted the work of the school. 
Only in the aggregate did that name-calling substantially disrupt Hailee’s 
education by causing her suicide and therefore the work of the school. 
Similarly, neither could those individual instances of name-calling be said 
to have injured Hailee’s rights. First, that standard is vague, as it does not 
make clear whether the rights injured must be recognized legal rights or 
some other measure of rights. Whatever those rights were, any one-time 
instance of calling Hailee a name, while hurtful to her feelings, can hardly 
be said to have hurt her rights, however those rights might be defined.188 
Yet, for the school to have intervened to protect Hailee when she was called 
“fat” at any one time, it would have had to meet one of those standards for 
the intervention to be constitutional. As such, the school probably could not 
have disciplined any one instance of a student calling Hailee an expletive 
and met the Tinker standard. Thus, Hailee’s school could not have 
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intervened after any one instance of bullying without offending the First 
Amendment.  
However, that has not stopped the lower courts from applying the Tinker 
standard in the bullying context to the opposite conclusion.189 When they 
have done so, the effort is, as one commentator has pointed out, at least 
sometimes forced.190 The lower courts’ decisions about whether the bullying 
speech should have been suppressed seems to rest on the courts’ views about 
whether the behavior should have been punished as opposed to whether the 
speech gave schools reason to anticipate a substantial disruption in school 
or injury to the rights of others.191 These kinds of reaches of logic should 
not give solace to schools hoping to address bullying without violating the 
First Amendment. That the courts have at times engaged in these logical 
leaps to find schools’ suppressions of student speech constitutional should 
not suggest that the courts have satisfied the Constitution; rather, these 
results only provide evidence showing that the schools have found a court 
willing to so conclude on scant evidence or reasoning. 
C. Anti-Bullying Laws that Stand in Tension with Deference Rationales 
The anti-bullying laws are problematic on still another level. The laws 
do not align with any of the work the Court understands schools to do and 
that serve as the justification, in conjunction with the type of speech, for 
any level of deference the schools receive to suppress student speech.192 
By focusing heavily on school exclusion either implicitly or explicitly, the 
work that anti-bullying laws call for schools to do, viewed in light of 
relevant, decades-long social science research, does not teach students to 
participate as citizens in the democracy, educate them on behavioral 
norms, or protect them. At times, the work of school exclusion does the 
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opposite, making the bullying worse.193 As such, even when the laws 
arguably do not violate the Constitution, they allow schools deference to 
suppress student speech to no end or the end of exacerbating bullying.194 
Although the Court has tied varying levels of deference to the schools’ 
role as it relates to the type of speech—sometimes allowing for the 
categorical suppression of speech and other times not—the work the anti-
bullying laws call for schools to do stands in tension with all these roles.195  
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1. School Exclusion: Denying Participation, Teaching Intolerance 
and Inappropriate Behaviors, and Exposing Victims to Harm 
The nature of school exclusion by way of suspensions and expulsions 
stands in tension with the Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work. 
By nature, school exclusion by suspension, expulsion, and grouping students 
removes students from the learning environment largely or entirely.196 As 
such, schools cannot teach students anything while they are so excluded, let 
alone teach students how to participate in the democracy or the value of 
tolerance. Although excluding the bully from school may allow the victims to 
learn their role as citizens temporarily without being bullied in school, the 
bully, as noted above, eventually returns to school. Even this temporary bully-
free learning is questionable, as a bully can continue to torment a victim using 
electronic means throughout a period of suspension or expulsion. 
Excluding a student from school because of bullying does send the 
message that the behavior is not acceptable. However, communicating that 
bullying is unacceptable by way of school exclusion teaches only that the 
particular bullying behavior is inappropriate. It does not teach any 
concomitant appropriate behavior. As such, school exclusion by suspension 
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or expulsion does not teach students who bully behavioral norms or the 
line between socially appropriate and inappropriate behavior.  
Similarly, the effects of school exclusion in the bullying context stand 
in tension with the Court’s conception of the work of the schools. Social 
scientists have studied the use of suspensions or expulsions as a method 
for addressing bullying and found that its effects are counterproductive.197 
This research reveals that suspending or expelling students who bully from 
school actually aggravates bullying198 and can result in increased 
recidivism.199 Social science research also shows that the effects of 
grouping students who bully together are counterproductive to preventing 
and addressing bullying and thus to work of the schools as the Supreme 
Court understands it.200 When students who bully are grouped together in 
these ways, they reinforce each other’s negative behaviors, and they learn 
new negative behaviors from each other.201 Recidivism is also associated 
with this form of school exclusion. Thus, the effect of grouping students 
is to facilitate the learning of intolerance and new socially inappropriate 
behaviors as well as to further subject victims to harm.202 Therefore, this 
intervention method also does not protect victims or in any way address 
the harmful effects of bullying.  
Using methods that could potentially result in more bullying allows, 
or even encourages, students to engage in behaviors that are antithetical to 
participation as citizens in the democracy, teaching students the value of 
tolerance and protecting them. Students who bully do not participate; they 
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dominate.203 School exclusion at best allows and at worst encourages the 
intolerance that is elemental to allowing bullying to continue by permitting 
students to learn new, negative, and arguably intolerant behaviors. Finally, 
school exclusion instead exposes the victim to more harm because it has 
been shown to increase recidivism and worsen the bullying.  
2. Peer-to-Peer Interventions: Exposing the Victims to Harm Without 
Teaching Tolerance or the Line Between Appropriate and 
Inappropriate Behavior 
Even when the anti-bullying laws deviate from their focus on various 
methods of school exclusion and identify alternative methods of 
intervention, some of the alternative methods do not align with the 
Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work. Specifically, peer-to-
peer interventions, which are identified as alternative interventions in 
some states’ anti-bullying laws, are by their nature and effects antithetical 
to the Court’s view of schools.204 The nature of these interventions is to 
bring together the bully and victim in mediation or to engage in restorative 
justice. In doing so, these methods fail to consider the power differential 
at issue in bullying.205 As previously discussed, bullying is distinguishable 
from teasing, even mean teasing, and other kinds of negative or hurtful 
behaviors by power.206 A bully has power that he or she uses against the 
victim.207 Peer-to-peer interventions, such as mediation and restorative 
justice, assume the lack of such a power differential.208 As a result, these 
methods can be counterproductive, causing additional victimization of the 
student who has been or is being bullied.209 Therefore, peer-to-peer 
                                                                                                         
 203. In the case of bully-victims, the students both dominate at times and at 
others do not. Internalizing Problems, supra note 42, at 65–66; Cook, supra note 
45, at 76–80. 
 204. For example, Illinois’s anti-bullying law, while laudable in its effort to 
identify and thereby guide schools to use alternative forms of intervention to 
address bullying, includes the use of some of these peer-to-peer methods. Supra 
notes 86 and accompanying text.  
 205. Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292–93. 
 206. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31, at 11. 
 207. Cornell et al., supra note 31, at 138; Jimerson et al., supra note 31, at 11. 
 208. See Bradshaw, supra note 195, at 292–93; see also Maria M. Ttofi & 
David P. Farrington, Effectiveness of School-Based Programs to Reduce Bullying: 
A Systematic and Meta-Analytic Review, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 27, 
43 (2010). 
 209. See supra Part III.B. 




methods do not protect the victim. Rather, they give the bully a way to 
harm the victim further.210  
IV. A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFERENCE APPROACH TO REFORM 
Although anti-bullying laws can at times violate the First Amendment 
on multiple fronts, that does not mean that no anti-bullying law can pass 
constitutional muster. Indeed, the foregoing analysis of the anti-bullying 
laws in light of the Supreme Court’s understanding of schools’ work 
serves as a way forward. If schools better aligned their work with the work 
the Court understands schools to do by, at the very least, eliminating 
school exclusion as a response to bullying except in rare circumstances, 
then an argument exists that schools should have more deference to 
suppress student speech reasonably deemed bullying speech. Under such 
a framework, schools should have categorical deference to suppress 
student-bullying speech. Having such deference would avoid the pitfalls 
attendant to the use of the Tinker standard. Tying that deference 
specifically to speech that is bullying, meaning speech that involves the 
exploitation of a power differential between students, would work to avoid 
facial challenges based on overly broad speech restrictions in the anti-
bullying laws. For, as the Third Circuit indicated in Saxe, satisfying the 
deferential school speech standards can insulate even overly broad laws 
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from being found unconstitutional as applied.211 The starting point, 
though, would involve amending the anti-bullying laws so that the laws 
better aligned with the work the Court conceives of schools as doing, 
which in turn raises the questions of whether such interventions exist and 
what they are. 
A. Bullying Interventions that Align with the Supreme Court’s 
Understanding of Schools’ Work in its Student Speech Cases 
Just as social science research offers insights into the ways that some 
bullying interventions are counterproductive, it also offers insight regarding 
interventions that are effective. Understanding how these methods work to 
address bullying reveals how anti-bullying laws could better align, in 
varying ways, with the Court’s conception of schools.  
Chief among these methods are graduated interventions that involve 
the family and community, as well as the school. For example, social 
science researchers have studied the Positive Behavioral Interventions and 
Supports (“PBIS”) method. PBIS is a non-curricular, three-tiered, and 
school-wide system of interventions designed to “achieve behavior change 
in schools.”212 Tier One is universal, meaning the interventions apply to 
all students.213 Tier Two involves selective interventions for smaller 
groups of students who either have behavioral problems despite Tier One 
interventions or who have suffered as victims of bullying and thus need 
more specialized interventions.214 In the bullying context, this might 
involve “social skills training for . . . children at risk for becoming 
involved in bullying” or counseling for the victim.215 Tier Three 
interventions are individual and more intensive interventions directed at 
students identified as a bully or victim.216 PBIS when applied generally 
has been found to reduce behavioral problems in school and thus has been 
recommended by social scientists as an intervention for bullying.217 Other 
similarly tiered responses have also resulted in significant reductions in 
bullying in schools.218 The tiered Olweus method developed by Professor 
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Dan Olweus, a psychologist who has studied bullying for decades, has also 
resulted in significant reductions in bullying.219 The social–ecological 
method, which calls for multi-level approaches to bullying, including 
involvement of others outside the school, such as family, has also led to 
reductions in bullying.220  
If these methods are reducing behavioral problems in schools, the 
methods are teaching students behavioral norms and tolerance of others. 
The methods are also preventing students from being excluded from 
school because they are behaving better and so can learn to participate in 
school and in the democracy. If less bullying is taking place, then fewer 
students are being victimized. Not only do they protect students, the 
methods also offer ways to intervene to address the negative effects of 
bullying when it does happen. In all of these ways, these methods would 
have schools approach bullying interventions in ways that align with the 
Supreme Court’s view of schools’ roles and address more fully the 
complicated effects of bullying than the anti-bullying laws do now. 
Despite their benefits, though, researchers have acknowledged that the 
methods can be challenging to implement because of their comprehensive, 
multi-level nature.221  
Fortunately, social science research has also found that less intensive 
methods of addressing bullying also work. Foremost among these methods 
is increasing supervision in areas where students are typically 
unsupervised.222 Students often feel the least safe from bullying in these 
areas, including bathrooms, hallways, and playgrounds.223 Increasing the 
supervision in these areas can be an effective method for reducing 
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bullying.224 It also opens new avenues and opportunities for teachers to 
address bullying as it is about to happen and teach students tolerance of 
others and how to behave appropriately in the context of school. It offers 
a way for schools to embody the role the Court understands them to play 
by giving them a way to protect students from bullying.  
Social science researchers have also found that teaching parents about 
bullying and how to address it is an effective part of bullying programs.225 
Training teachers and staff at schools on recognizing bullying and methods 
for effectively addressing bullying also helps to combat the problem.226 
This recognition is a necessary precursor to teaching students the line 
between inappropriate and appropriate behavior, specifically that bullying 
is inappropriate behavior that conflicts with the value of tolerance. It is 
also a necessary precursor to protecting victims, as a school cannot protect 
a victim from something it does not recognize is happening.  
However, the bullying laws, with rare exceptions, do not identify these 
methods for intervening in bullying.227 By preventing bullying before it 
happens, schools help to teach students the line between appropriate and 
inappropriate behavior. By not excluding or segregating students who 
bully and instead using other methods for addressing bullying, schools 
teach tolerance and allow students to learn to participate as citizens. By 
working better to end bullying and address its negative effects, schools 
help protect the victim and offer a more comprehensive approach to the 
complicated problem of bullying. Instead, the anti-bullying laws focus on 
school exclusion.228 If the laws did use some method other than school 
exclusion or other interventions found to be ineffective by social science 
literature, they would go a long way to avoiding the tension that now exists 
between the Supreme Court’s view of schools’ role and the role the 
bullying laws have schools play.  
B. Amending the Bullying Laws to Align Deference Rationales and the 
Supreme Court’s Understanding of Schools’ Work  
Legislatures should take heed of the Court’s understanding of schools’ 
roles and use that understanding and social science research as a guide for 
amending anti-bullying laws to better address bullying. Legislatures should 
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do so not only because such guidance offers a chance to meaningfully 
address bullying, but also because aligning the laws with the role the Court 
has envisioned for schools offers a way to address and resolve the First 
Amendment problems with the anti-bullying laws. Perhaps most 
importantly, better aligning the anti-bullying laws with the Supreme 
Court’s view of schools’ role would more adequately serve students. It 
would better honor the call of Hailee Lamberth’s final note.  
First, legislatures should largely or totally eliminate the use of school 
exclusion as a method for intervening to address bullying. Social science 
literature has shown the problems associated with school exclusion in the 
context of bullying. It simply, with rare possible exceptions, does not 
address the problem. From there, legislatures could choose from a variety 
of other methods of intervention to address bullying.  
As there are multiple effective methods of addressing bullying other 
than school exclusion, states need only pick from among them and amend 
their laws to include those effective approaches. Although passing 
legislation is no simple process, each year for the last several years, at least 
one or two states have amended their anti-bullying laws.229 It is certainly 
possible, even likely, that states will continue in the coming years to 
amend their anti-bullying laws. When states do, they should amend their 
anti-bullying laws to include a requirement that schools use methods that 
social science has found effective for addressing bullying.  
A possible critique to this approach, though, is cost. Implementing PBIS 
or another similar school-wide program could be costly, not to mention time 
consuming.230 Yet, if schools and states truly want to address bullying, it 
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makes little sense to do so in an ineffective way. The cost may be 
unavoidable, as at least some states have already begun to recognize. In 
response to Hailee Lamberth’s suicide, Nevada revised its anti-bullying 
statute in the spring of 2015 to make it more effective.231 Among other 
things, the newly revised law allocates $16 million to schools to hire social 
workers specifically to address bullying.232 With enough political will, the 
cost concern can be overcome.  
All said, lower-cost, non-school-wide methods have, as noted above, 
also been found to work. For example, schools can do much to help combat 
bullying simply by increasing supervision in traditionally unsupervised 
areas, such as hallways and bathrooms, where students feel least safe and 
bullying is most likely to happen.233 Adopting this approach would require 
little or no additional cost to schools because schools’ current staff could 
be deployed to provide this supervision. Thus, although there are higher-
cost means of addressing bullying, schools can adopt effective anti-
bullying approaches with minimal costs.  
C. A First Amendment Deference Argument 
Of course, legislatures need not follow any guidance from the 
Supreme Court in developing local school policy. If they did, such that 
schools’ available responses to bullying better aligned with the work the 
Court understands schools to do—at the very least by eliminating school 
exclusion as a response to bullying except in rare circumstances—then a 
First Amendment argument exists that schools should have more 
deference when they act to suppress student-bullying speech. That is, there 
is an argument that schools should have the deference to suppress student-
bullying speech as a categorical matter, meaning the deference to suppress 
any speech that could reasonably be deemed bullying speech. This argument 
would involve adding a layer to the analytic framework for determining 
schools’ deference to suppress student speech. Instead of the schools’ 
deference to suppress student speech being dependent on the type of speech 
and the schools’ role in relation to it, in the bullying context this argument 
calls for a framework in which the means schools use are considered. In 
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this proposed framework, if the means were aligned with effectuating the 
Court’s understanding of schools’ role, then that would justify more 
deference for the suppression of student-bullying speech.  
The support for that deference argument is three-fold. First, better 
aligning the work the schools do in the bullying context to the work the 
Court understands schools to do by at least eliminating methods like 
school exclusion that do not address bullying would essentially have a 
tailoring effect justifying increased deference. The work that the Court 
understands schools to do, though usually conceptualized by the Court as 
schools’ roles or functions, are also state interests.234 In identifying those 
roles to justify giving schools deference to suppress student speech, the 
Court is acknowledging the legitimacy of state interests. Better aligning 
schools’ responses to bullying to that work, or those interests, then, 
justifies increased, categorical First Amendment deference in the bullying 
context because it better ensures the work is being done or, put another 
way, the state interests are being achieved. Moreover, the Court has 
already allowed schools this kind of categorical deference in the case of 
lewd and drug-promoting speech.235 Although the Court has not tied that 
categorical deference to how well tailored the schools’ means are in 
effectuating those roles, in the case of bullying where much is known 
about what works, and perhaps more importantly, that the previous 
standard methods of school exclusion do not work, it should require better 
tailoring to justify the deference.236  
Second, increasing school deference based on legislation that better 
aligns schools’ anti-bullying efforts with the Court’s conception of schools 
would avoid the problems involved in applying the Tinker standard and 
thus would save the application of the laws from violating the First 
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Amendment at all, as Saxe suggests can be done despite overbreadth. That 
standard is sometimes rather unworkable in the bullying context, but is 
nonetheless the standard the lower courts have thus far applied to bullying 
cases.237 Giving schools more deference to suppress student-bullying 
speech categorically would circumvent these problems because it would 
allow schools to suppress any speech that could reasonably be deemed 
bullying speech—if anti-bullying laws called for schools to use methods 
other than school exclusion to address bullying—irrespective of whether 
it could be said to cause the school to anticipate a substantial disruption. It 
would allow them to intervene to address the kind of bullying speech 
Hailee endured.  
Third, affording schools this deference would better protect student 
rights. Although it might seem counterintuitive to argue that suppressing 
student speech better protects student rights, in this context the argument is 
strong. As things currently stand, schools have a significant amount of 
deference to suppress student speech regardless of its effect in the bullying 
context—sometimes to no end and sometimes to the end of exacerbating the 
bullying. Although the approach discussed here would increase schools’ 
deference, or authority, to suppress student speech, it would only do so if 
the anti-bullying laws changed to better align with the work the Court 
understands schools to do. Such change would also mean better addressing 
the complicated causes and effects of bullying and thereby would better 
protect and assist both victims and students who bully. Imagine, then, a law 
that called for schools to intervene in bullying and thus suppress bullying 
speech by not using school exclusion and instead using PBIS or increased 
counseling, which have been used to good effect in the bullying context and 
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so align with the work the Court understands schools to do, for the bully or 
the victim. Those schools would have deference to suppress student speech 
that could reasonably be deemed bullying speech by requiring PBIS 
interventions or counseling. That deference and the suppression of student-
bullying speech would be used to better address bullying and its complicated 
effects on the victim and the bully.  
One criticism of this argument, though, might be that schools should 
not be afforded deference to suppress student-bullying speech given the 
increased authority they have under the anti-bullying laws, including to do 
things like broadly monitor students’ online and electronic activity.238 This 
critique first ignores the fact that schools now have a significant amount 
of deference to do just that kind of surveillance to no end or to the end of 
exacerbating the bullying problem. Second, in a previous article, the 
author called for limits on that authority, and does not abandon those 
proposals here.239 Indeed, they work in conjunction with the arguments set 
forth here.240 Those limits on school surveillance authority, coupled with 
basing any increased deference to suppress student-bullying speech on 
laws that better tailor schools’ available responses to the work the Court 
understands schools to do, should still protect student rights by ensuring 
the deference is only given when the schools’ responses work to 
effectively limit bullying and address its complicated effects. 
However, an argument exists that increased deference is not needed 
because the reasoning of Fraser and Morse applies in the context of 
bullying without any attendant means analysis. As the Court gave schools 
deference to suppress student drug-promoting speech as a categorical 
matter in those cases, then schools should get the same level of deference 
with respect to bullying speech. That argument fails to recognize that at 
least one lower court has extended the reasoning of Morse to the bullying 
context, but then applied the Tinker standard. In Kowalski v. Berkeley 
County Schools, the Fourth Circuit considered a student’s First 
Amendment claim in the context of cyberbullying.241 The student had been 
suspended from school for creating a website that targeted another student 
by calling her names.242 Referencing the schools’ protective role identified 
in Morse, the court stated that “[j]ust as schools have a responsibility to 
provide a safe environment for students free from messages advocating 
illegal drug use . . . schools have a duty to protect their students from 
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harassment and bullying in the school environment.”243 Despite using this 
Morse rationale, the court did not conclude that bullying speech could be 
categorically suppressed as the Supreme Court concluded with respect to 
drug-promoting speech in Morse.244 The Fourth Circuit instead applied the 
less deferential Tinker standard, which requires that the school anticipated 
that the speech would cause a substantial disruption or be injurious to the 
rights of others.245 Thus at least one lower court has not found that bullying 
justifies any more deference to suppress student speech beyond that 
afforded them in Tinker even when it extended the rationale of Morse to 
the bullying context.  
Of course an argument could be made that the Fourth Circuit simply 
reached the wrong result in Kowalski, and it should have given the school 
deference to suppress bullying speech as a categorical matter based on the 
reasoning in Morse. Such an argument would allow for the suppression of 
student speech and the infringement on important student rights often to 
no end. That result is simply untenable for both the bully, whose rights 
would be suppressed, and the victim, who would not be protected.  
Another possible critique of this argument is that it would require courts 
to assess the methodology of schools in order to determine whether they 
should get added deference to suppress bullying speech. The Court has 
repeatedly stated that lower courts should not inquire into the daily workings 
of schools.246 That critique, though, misunderstands the nature of the 
argument. The argument does not call for an inquiry into the precise nature 
of any particular method of addressing bullying or an assessment of how 
well schools are implementing the means called for by the legislatures.247 
Instead, it simply argues that if legislatures call for or require schools to take 
some meaningful steps, which precludes, largely or totally, school 
exclusion, to align with the Court’s understanding of schools’ role and 
address bullying in ways that do not cause more bullying, then the courts 
should give them deference to suppress all speech that can reasonably be 
construed as bullying speech. No examination of the school’s day-to-day 
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work or methodology other than whether the legislature has called for such 
steps need occur.  
A related criticism to this argument is that it leaves the determination of 
constitutional deference up to social science. However, this ignores the 
distinction between the means framework for analysis, which calls for an 
assessment of the means by which schools address bullying and would give 
deference if they at least use methods other than those that clearly do not 
work, and the substance of the actual methods themselves. The deference 
would not depend on the use of any particular method. The deference would 
depend on the use of some methods that do something to address bullying 
and thereby align with the Court’s conception of schools. That can rarely, 
if ever, include school exclusion. Even though the alignment may not be a 
perfect alignment, it will at least not be the near-total misalignment that is 
school exclusion in relation to the bullying problem.248 
Finally, one could criticize this argument by suggesting that better 
aligning the work the anti-bullying laws call for schools to do with the 
work the Court understands schools to do, would too tightly constrain the 
schools. It would too greatly limit their ability to exclude students from 
school. However, at least one state and some school districts are so 
limiting school exclusion by suspension and expulsion on their own. 
Illinois has recently passed a law that makes school exclusion the 
disciplinary option of last resort.249 Similarly, the Miami Dade County 
Schools and the Seattle School Board have also moved to limit 
suspensions and expulsions.250 That states and school districts are limiting 
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school exclusion more generally suggests that the constraints on school 
exclusion in the bullying context would not too greatly constrain schools’ 
ability to respond to bullying, particularly if the anti-bullying laws 
provided schools with guidance on alternative responses to bullying that 
better align with the work the Court understands schools to do, which in 
turn better address bullying.  
D. Student Implications 
Perhaps the most compelling reason for considering whether the anti-
bullying laws should better align with the Court’s conceptions of schools’ 
roles is that doing so would make schools better equipped to protect 
victims of bullying. It bears repeating that bullying is an enormous and 
consequential problem. When Nevada revised its bullying law in the 
spring of 2015, reports stated that there were over 4,000 incidences of 
bullying the previous year alone in Nevada schools.251 Those bullying 
events occurred even though Nevada had an anti-bullying law in place.252 
The anti-bullying laws, well-meaning though they may be, seek to address 
the problem with traditional punitive methods that simply do not work 
except in rare circumstances.253 To truly address the problem, the laws 
have to do more than rely on traditionally punitive methods of addressing 
bullying with their focus on school exclusion. The laws must embrace the 
role of schools as the Supreme Court has conceived it. To do that, the anti-
bullying laws and schools should adopt methods of addressing bullying 
that prevent the bullying from happening, whether by increasing 
supervision or providing counseling to the bully to address the problems 
that lead to the bullying behavior.254 They should also more effectively 
address the effects of bullying. Again, following Nevada’s lead could go 
a long way toward achieving this end. By doing so, they would be teaching 
students to participate in school and therefore eventually in the democracy. 
They would also be teaching students the value of tolerance and behavioral 
norms. They would also be protecting actual or potential bullying victims. 
By putting more social workers in schools devoted to addressing bullying, 
schools provide students with skilled professionals who can help them 
with the depression, anxiety, suicidal ideation, and the other effects of 
bullying for both the bully and the victim. These kinds of approaches 
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would not only better align the schools’ efforts with the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, they would also help students and prevent bullying and 
better address its complicated effects when it does happen.255  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has focused on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
jurisprudence and a deconstruction of its deference rationales in the student 
speech context to evaluate the limited, punitive approach the anti-bullying 
laws have schools take to address bullying. Its focus is on the Court’s student 
speech cases because so much of bullying is speech. The Court’s student 
speech cases reveal that the Court has a particular understanding of the roles 
of schools as they relate to certain categories of speech and that relationship 
justifies the degree of deference they receive to suppress student speech. 
Analyzing the anti-bullying laws in light of the First Amendment reveals 
both that the anti-bullying laws raise First Amendment concerns and also 
are problematic in their focus on discipline and school exclusion. However, 
First Amendment jurisprudence also offers a way forward. If anti-bullying 
laws called for schools to better align with the work the Court understands 
schools do by, at the very least, largely eliminating the use of school 
exclusion as a means to respond to bullying, then there is an argument that 
schools should receive more deference to suppress student-bullying speech. 
Perhaps most importantly, better responding to bullying by not using school 
exclusion and thus having more deference to so respond would better protect 
students, like Hailee Lamberth, who are looking to schools to help address 
the problem of bullying.  
Of course not all bullying is speech, and to the extent schools have to 
address physical or other forms of bullying that do not constitute speech, 
the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence is, in a sense, of no moment. 
But if states and schools take heed of the Court’s understanding of schools’ 
role in its student speech cases and better align their anti-bullying efforts 
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with that role and jettison the use of school exclusion in the bullying 
context, the impact can be broader. It can have the effect of not just better 
preventing and addressing bullying when it takes the form of speech, but 
it can better address all bullying. 
